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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's current preemption jurisprudence can be neatly
summarized in three black letter rules that cannot easily be applied in a
manner that protects federal policies from intrusions by the fifty States. The
first rule is that the touchstone of preemption analysis is Congress's
intention to permit or proscribe state regulatory activity.' Rule two says that
preemption analysis, meaning the sources of federal preemptive authority,
revolves around four distinct doctrinal categories - express2 preemption,
conflict preemption, obstacle preemption, and field preemption. Rule three
says that there should be a presumption against preemption where the
relevant state regulatory activity falls within a field of traditional state

* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, D.C. Many thanks to Ashley
C. Parrish, my close
academic and litigating collaborator, Marie Cayco, and Andy Oldham, whose invaluable and very
substantive assistance helped to shape these insights and prepare this piece for publication.
1. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (noting that
Congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" of all preemption analysis).
2. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).

4
authority. 3 All three rules are landmarks of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
All three were inherited by the Rehnquist Court from post-New Deal

precedents. 5

As currently formulated and applied, however, none of the

three captures the constitutional calculus that should - and in the bestreasoned cases actually does - drive decisional outcomes. 6 This article

suggests reformulating the preemption rules, by reinforcing the best analysis
from the best-reasoned cases, in order to achieve greater clarity and
constitutional integrity in this important area of law.
1I.
A.

REFORMULATING THE BLACK LETTER RULES

Rule 1: Congress'sIntent As The Touchstone OfPreemption Analysis

The notion that the touchstone of preemption analysis is or should be
Congress's specific intention to displace an identifiable body of state law is
perhaps the least controversial -

but ultimately the most problematic and

subversive - of our current black letter rules. As an initial matter, there is
strong evidence that concrete intentions do not in fact animate Congress's
draftsmanship of express preemption provisions. For example, many
statutes confusingly contain both broad preemption provisions and broad
savings clauses. These statutory structures, far from rare or exceptional, are
found in health and safety statutes; 7 economic regulatory regimes; 8 benefits
regulations; 9 and environmental statutes. 0
Likewise, many statutory

3. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
4. See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (and cases cited therein).
5. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (and cases cited therein);
see also Stephen Gardbaum New Deal Constitutionalismand the Unshackling of States, 64 U. CHI.
L. REv. 483, 533 (1997) (noting that in the New Deal era, the Supreme Court revised its preemption
doctrine by establishing "a new requirement that state law is preempted if and only if Congress
intends the federal statute in question to have this effect, and has clearly manifested such intent").
6. The scholarly preemption literature is voluminous. Compare, e.g., Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 229 (2000) (stating that "[a]dvocates of 'states' rights' have
obvious reasons to oppose preemption: They dislike many federal statutes to begin with, and they
want those statutes to leave states with as much policymaking authority as possible.") with Gregory
L. Taddonio, Revisiting Myrick v. Freightliner: Applying the Brakes on Restrictive Preemption
Analysis, 14 J.L. & CoM. 257, 273 (1995) (explaining how activity in state courts can "undermine
the premise behind the Constitution's Supremacy Clause by permitting an inconsistent state common
law claim to outlast a federal statute."). See also Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist
Court, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 431, 436 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000) (stating that "no State or local government" has "any
authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service"); 47 U.S.C.
§ 414 (2000) ("[n]othing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies").
9. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000)
(preempting "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan" governed by ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) ("[e]xcept as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities").
10. See Bates, 125 S. Ct at 1788; Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1990).
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preemption provisions are drawn in exceedingly broad - and in many
instances patently opaque - terms. The express preemption provision in
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), which has
spawned more Supreme Court litigation than any other such provision, 1
imposes federal preemption on all state laws "relat[ing] to any employee

benefit plan." 12

Other express preemption provisions employ similar

locutions such as preempting all law "related to a price, route, or service of

an air carrier." 13 The seeming opacity of such "relating to" language has
prompted Justice Scalia to observe that efforts to enforce such provisions
according to their terms are necessarily "doomed to failure."' 4 And strictly

speaking it is hard to disagree. It is certainly difficult to discern in such
directives

any concrete

congressional

guidance pointing to specific

categories of (or even examples of) state laws subject to federal preemption.
Instead of parsing the language of such express-preemption provisions
for concrete meaning that may well be absent, courts should recognize them

as general instructions to apply preemption as broadly as necessary. Express
preemption provisions that are either broadly framed or accompanied with
savings clauses presumptively call for the displacement of some not
precisely-definable class of state law in order to protect federal statutory
regimes and effectuate their purposes.' 5 The fact that Congress often paints

over state law with broad preemptive brush-strokes is frequently met with
lamentation. A common response from commenters of various stripes is the
assertion that preemption, both express and implied, should be narrowly
applied in order to force the congressional hand; induce the congressional
11. See, e.g., Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002); Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000); UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust &
Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); D.C. v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990);
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc.,
486 U.S. 825 (1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981); see generally Matthew 0. Gatewood, The New
Map: The Supreme Court's Guide to Curing Thirty Years of Confusion in ERISA Savings Clause
Analysis, 62 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 643, 647-48 (2005).
12. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
13. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(l) (2000).
14. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. See United States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969)
(giving remedial statutes a "liberal construction"); Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932) (emphasizing that remedial legislation should receive "a broader
and more liberal interpretation than that to be drawn from mere dictionary definitions of the words
employed by Congress"); but see Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983) ("It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that
'[t]he common law ...ought not to be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and
explicit for this purpose."') (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

mind to contemplate which state statutes should and should not be

preempted; and prompt the congressional pen to write with specificity. The
corollary to this view is that the preemption provisions we actually have
reflect a slumbering Congress shirking its responsibility. But in fact
Congress cannot possibly draft precise preemption provisions - either
before States act or afterward. For several interrelated reasons, it is
unrealistic to expect Congress to form specific intentions as to what state
regulatory activity it wishes to permit or proscribe.
First,it is a truism, but an important one, that written law is necessarily

infused with ambiguity, which will become evident as the law is applied to
events.

It has been recognized at least since Medieval times that no

lawmaker can anticipate all circumstances in which a given law will be
applied. 16 In the preemption context, this means Congress cannot possibly
anticipate the precise state activity deserving of preemption. Just as
lawmakers can never fully anticipate what private parties will do, Congress

cannot possibly anticipate what States might do to undermine federal
policies. Precisely because no law can provide for all contingencies, letting
state experimentation flourish will, at a minimum, allow States to undermine
federal policies in the not-insubstantial interim between the point when the
baleful consequences of state experiments gone awry become manifest and
the time when responsive preemptive legislation can be enacted.

Second, the complexities involved in framing preemptive meta-laws
restricting state lawmaking are far greater than those associated with writing
primary law restricting private conduct. Consider, as an example, the
broadly drawn provisions of Section 17200 of the California Business and
Professions Code. 17 This broad wording has led, in many instances, to
applications unfair to, and unanticipated by, businesses.' 8 But the solution
to this unfairness cannot possibly be as simple as providing exact legal
descriptions of what trade practices are permitted and proscribed. A
legislature could not possibly define every conceivable type of deceptive or

unfair practice that might bilk consumers. Because no legislature could
describe in advance each and every prohibited practice, a broadly drawn
remedial law is inevitable.

16. See St. Thomas Aquinas, TREATISE ON LAW, Question 96, Art. 6 (R.J. Henle, S.J. ed.,
Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1993) ("[N]ullius hominis sapentia tanta est ut possit omnes singulares
casus excogitare; et ideo non potest sufficienter per verba exprimere ea quae conveniunt adfinem
intentum ... . No man is so wise that he can take into account every single case, and, therefore, he
cannot sufficiently express in words everything that is conducive to the end he intends.").
17. CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 et seq. (West 2005).
18. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099, cert
dismissed as improvidently granted,539 U.S. 654 (2003) (holding that a corporation that participates
in a public debate - writing letters to newspaper editors and to educators and publishing
communications addressed to the general public on issues of great political, social, and economic
importance - may be subject to liability under California law for factual inaccuracies on the theory
that its statements are "commercial speech"); Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen.
Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 676 (Cal. 1983) (allowing Section 17200 complaint to proceed on theory
that defendants had "engaged in a nationwide, long-term advertising campaign designed to persuade
children to influence their parents to buy sugared cereals").
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The critical point for preemption analysis is that, as one moves from
primary law governing private conduct to meta-law governing the
preemption of state lawmaking, the problem of anticipating future
consequences is made geometrically more difficult. Any preemption of
sovereign lawmaking must, by definition, account both for all possible types
of relevant private conduct and for all possible types of counterproductive
state regulation of that conduct. The number of scenarios of concern can
therefore be estimated by multiplying one very large number (representing
modes of private conduct) by a second very large number (representing
The
modes of counterproductive state regulation of that conduct).
real
in
the
plays
out
law
a
given
how
of
envisioning
problem
ever-present
world is thus multiplied many times over in the preemption context. 19
Third, there are fifty sovereign States that might potentially infringe the
policies of Congress or the Executive Branch. The geometric increase in
complexity discussed above describes only the difficulties of anticipating
and pre-interdicting the counter-productive ways in which a single sovereign
might undermine federal policies. Our system encompasses fifty such
sovereigns. And, for better or worse, current Supreme Court doctrine
permits each of the fifty States wide latitude in imposing its policies in
extraterritorial fashion. 20 As a practical matter, then, effective congressional
pre-interdiction efforts must account for all types of private conduct of
concern, as well as all types of counterproductive state regulation that might
potentially reach such conduct, as well as how these complex interactions
might play out in the political, economic, and social contexts of any of the
fifty States.
Fourth, although state actors are usually public-spirited, we know from
no less acute an observer than James Madison that state governments,
especially, are subject to capture by factions. 21 Experienced attorneys of our
own day would, I believe, confirm this diagnosis. It is frequently observed
that political interest groups that have lost in a federal legislative,
administrative, or judicial process are sorely tempted to appeal their federal
losses to state legislatures, courts, or attorneys general.22 These interest
groups are inevitably sophisticated enough to figure out that their efforts
19. Cf H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (distinguishing primary law from metalaw and, separately, discussing the difficulties of laying down comprehensive legal rules in
advance).
20. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (describing due process
limitations on the extent to which state laws may be given extra-territorial application); Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003) (declining to strictly enforce the Full Faith and Credit
Clause).
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
22. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down California
statute requiring disclosure of information concerning Holocaust-era insurance policies); Crosby v.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking down Massachusetts statute prohibiting
Massachusetts and its agencies from purchasing goods and services from companies that did
business with Burma).

should target those States most susceptible to their appeals, blandishments,
and intrigues. Factions that lose at the national level can therefore be
expected as a matter of inherent political dynamics - call it a matter of
demanding constituent service - to attempt to induce the most susceptible
States to infringe, undermine, or totally nullify a federal policy equilibrium
they oppose.
Finally, post hoc congressional responses to state encroachments are
every bit as unrealistic as ex ante congressional preemption. For better or
worse, the Founders deliberately hobbled the Congress in a manner that
effectively precludes it from reacting to minor events occurring on multiple
fronts. Our Congress is not a unified parliament on the British model. The
Constitution imposes not only a separation of powers, but also checks and
balances, among the most important of which is the check on federal
legislative authority from that authority's division between a House of
Representatives, a Senate, and a veto-wielding President. 23 This division
was purposefully established at the Founding to disable the federal
legislative power, prevent Congress from legislating in the absence of what
amounts to a super-majority consensus,24 and defuse the dangers of a
"vortex" of untrammeled legislative power. 25 The answer to the advocates
of narrow preemption who contend that Congress can respond to wayward
States via after-the-fact preemption is that such policing is simply
impractical. Congress is a lone, divided entity that must attend to its own
legislative responsibilities. It cannot possibly react quickly and individually
to the innumerable major and minor incursions that interest groups can be
expected to demand of the States.
In summary, it is impossible for Congress to anticipate in advance or
nullify afterward all the many state laws deserving of federal preemption.
No legislature can envision the full effects of ordinary laws; it is especially
impossible for a legislature to pre-envision the need for preemptive laws;
and it is even more unrealistic to expect a legislature to pre-interdict state
action that occurs simultaneously on fifty fronts, and that, as a matter of
hydraulic political pressure, will center in those States most opposed to
federal policies. Likewise, a divided federal legislature cannot possibly
negate, after-the-fact, all of the intrusions one expects from fifty
quasi-independent and potentially hostile sovereigns.
Precisely because our federal institutions do not allow for a legislative
solution to the problem of protecting federal policy from the States, that
responsibility - if it is to be discharged at all - must be assumed by the
executive and judicial branches. For the reasons stated above, such
protections must necessarily be (i) context-specific, (ii) activated
after-the-fact, and (iii) imposed by an institution not practically disabled

23. See generally David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A PoliticalScience Approach, 20 CARDOzO L. REv. 947 (1999) (discussing
the nuances of the separation of powers doctrine).
24. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1221
(2001).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
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from making prompt, effective, and individualized responses. Under our
Constitution, those criteria point uniquely to the adjudicatory and quasiadjudicatory processes traditionally carried out by administrative agencies
and, above all, the judicial branch of government. The first principles of
preemption doctrine should therefore be that courts regard themselves as the
primary guardians of federal policies and that preemption applies broadly to
safeguard the effective operation of federal statutes.
B. Rule 2: The FourSources OfFederalPreemptive Authority
The second black letter rule in current jurisprudence is the four-fold
scheme that recognizes "express preemption," "obstacle preemption,"
"conflict preemption," and "field preemption" as distinct doctrinal
categories.26 But rather than being distinct, these categories overlap. In
truth, any preemption analysis of the collisions between state and federal
laws governing the same private conduct necessarily involves, not one, but
precisely two of these recognized categories. This overlapping of doctrinal
categories in the heartland of preemption jurisprudence - clashes between
the federal commerce power and state police power 7 - can be seen in the
following grid:
EXPRESS
PREEMPTION

IMPLIED
PREEMPTION

CONFLICT
PREEMPTION

Express-Conflict

Implied-ConflictWith-Federal-

Preemption

Objectives
Preemption

FIELD

Express-Field

Implied-Field

PREEMPTION

Preemption

Preemption

This grid illustrates that the Supreme Court's preemption decisions
divide, first, along the dimension of express versus implied preemption, and,

26. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see also Richard E. Levy,
Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L.
REv. 634, 664 (1984) (discussing the different forms of preemption).
27. The heartland of courts' preemption jurisprudence involves reconciliations of the federal
commerce power with the States' police power. But in addition to the Commerce Clause, important
federal displacements of state law can also occur pursuant to the Naturalization Clause, Bankruptcy
Clause, Patent Clause, Copyright Clause, foreign affairs powers, and other constitutional provisions.
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8., cl. 4 (Naturalization and Bankruptcy Clauses), cl. 8 (Copyright and
Patent Clauses); U.S. CONST. art II, §§ 2, 3 (delineating presidential powers and responsibilities with
respect to the conduct of war and foreign affairs). This article's analysis is limited to instances of
collisions between state and federal law regulating the same private conduct and, in particular,
collisions between the federal commerce power (as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause) and state police power. The article thus puts to the side questions of how preemption
analysis might change in instances of direct federal regulation of States, contexts not involving the
federal commerce power, or exercises of federal authority not primarily directed to private conduct.

secondarily, along lines of conflict versus field preemption. Express
preemption cases are those in which Congress has deliberately written a
statute directed at cabining the sovereign law-making activity of the fifty
States.28 By contrast, implied preemption involves federal law directed in
the first instance to private activity, but which by necessary implication
displaces additional, conflicting regulation of that same private activity by
State governments. Conflict preemption and field preemption occur through
both express preemption and implied preemption - the difference being
whether the particular congressional enactment addresses itself directly to
state lawmaking conduct, as opposed to private conduct.
The distinction between conflict and field preemption likewise arises
from the fundamental nature of a preemption inquiry. Conflict preemption
occurs where Congress either expressly or impliedly focuses on the
particular type of state law that must be disabled for the achievement of
federal purposes. 29 By contrast, field preemption arises where Congress
focuses expressly or impliedly on setting aside a specific type of activity that
must remain free of state regulation for federal purposes to be achieved. ° In
one case, the legislative focus is on the state regulation to be struck down; in
the other, the focus is on the flip-side of the coin - the private conduct to be
affirmatively protected from state intrusion.
And what of that odd category out: "obstacle" preemption? As an initial
matter, all preemption is "obstacle" preemption in the sense that all
preemption involves the striking down of state statutes that pose obstacles to
"the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.'
The obstacle preemption category might therefore be viewed
as a nugatory tautology.32 On a second look, however, the recognition of an
"obstacle" preemption principle serves a critical function in the express
preemption context.
In cases involving express preemption, the independent recognition of
obstacle preemption is analytically helpful: it emphasizes that in those cases,
as in other contexts, "[t]he Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as
33
simple-minded modes' of infringing on constitutional protections.,
Obstacle preemption is thus one instance of the general principle that
constitutional protections apply fully against infringements that have been
cleverly disguised under non-infringing forms of state action. In other
words, the same constitutional principle that holds unconstitutional facially

28. See Nelson, supranote 6, at 226-27.
29. See id. at 227-28.
30. See id. at 227.
31. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
32. Cf. Nelson, supra note 6, at 232, 287 (arguing that a general doctrine of obstacle
preemption is misplaced).
33. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995) (quoting Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939), and Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S 528, 540-41 (1965)).
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neutral
rules that are substantively discriminatory as to speech,34 religion,35
race, 36 or out-of-state businesses 37 encompasses attempted evasions of

express preemption provisions. In this context, the application of this firmly
rooted principle demands preemption of state regulations that substantively
infringe expressly preemptive federal statutes, even where the state
regulation in question facially avoids the narrow terms of preemptive
statutory language. Obstacle preemption ensures that state laws do not

evade express preemption by taking on creative legal forms in order to
accomplish forbidden purposes.38

But if the "obstacle preemption" rubric serves useful functions in
express preemption cases, it unfortunately retards analysis in implied
preemption cases. There, distinctions between "direct conflict" situations,
where "it is impossible for a private party to comply with both federal and
state requirements, 39 and "obstacle conflict" situations, "where state law
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress,"4 are almost always insignificant and

diversionary. For reasons canvassed above, one expects that States seeking
to undermine federal policies will be adroit enough to accomplish their
undermining without opening direct conflicts between state and federal law.
The essential core of the implied preemption caseload will therefore be the
many instances where, short of resorting to directly opposing federal law,
States obstruct the "accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress." Direct conflict cases are rare birds in bright
plumage perched atop a submerged jurisprudential iceberg of state laws
subtly undermining federal objectives.
A quantum advance in analytical clarity would be achieved simply by
merging the implied preemption analyses now carried out under the

"obstacle" and "direct conflict" categories into a unified inquiry that

34. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (striking down flag-burning
amendment as violative of the First Amendment); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (holding that the imposition of a use tax on the cost of paper and
ink products consumed in production of publications violated the First Amendment).
35. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
36. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (assessing constitutionality of written
personnel test alleged to have discriminatory impact); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
(holding that lawsuit challenging local act passed by Alabama legislature redefining city boundaries
to exclude minority votes stated cause of action under the Constitution's Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses).
37. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
38. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Sw. Bell Mobile, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 916 (N.D. 111.2001)
(concluding that plaintiffs' breach-of-contract allegations effectively challenged defendant's rates
and, therefore, were preempted under the Federal Telecommunications Act).
39. English v. Gen. Elec., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (citing Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
40. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 747 (1981).

analyzes preemption on grounds of "implied conflict with federal
objectives." As current doctrine stands, little is accomplished by asking
whether "it is impossible for a private party to comply with both federal and
state requirements." In those rare cases of direct conflict, the Constitution is
so clearly violated that the state law at issue may well be a statement of
dissent from federal policy or an overt challenge to Congress's authority to
legislate 41 - as opposed to a fair-minded attempt to supplement a federal
law whose constitutionality is accepted as a given. The "direct conflict"
prong of implied preemption analysis can thus form an analytical diversion
tending to delegitimize the hard work of ascertaining whether and to what
extent state law undermines federal objectives. It is as if courts confronting
Eighth Amendment claims, before getting down to business, asked first
whether a challenged practice involved "a drawing on the rack, boiling in
oil, or burning at the stake." In the implied preemption context, contested
"direct conflict" cases are only modestly more common - and only
marginally more difficult - than burning-at-the-stake Eighth Amendment
cases.
In sum, Courts should recognize that implied preemption always
involves the search for conflicts between state law and federal objectives,
accompanied by a recognition that such conflicts are easy to identify in cases
of direct opposition between state and federal law. Conversely, in the
express preemption context, the obstacle preemption rubric serves as a
critical reminder that displacements of state law via express preemption
must be interpreted liberally to accomplish their purposes.
Reformulated in this manner, current Supreme Court doctrine can
sensibly be seen as recognizing many of the underlying legal and logical
distinctions inherent in preemption analysis. Those distinctions include: (i)
the essential difference between preemptive law addressed to private activity
(implied preemption) and preemptive law addressed to state lawmaking
(express preemption); 42 (ii) the essential difference between enactments
negating specified state laws (conflict preemption) and enactments walling
private activity off from state interference (field preemption); and, finally,
(iii) the essential difference between legal substance and legal form
(between "obstacle" and "express" preemption) as that distinction has come
to be applied across a wide spectrum of constitutional analysis, including
preemption cases.
Notwithstanding its continuity with received doctrine, this reformulation
has consequences. As one example, it calls for the elaboration and

41. An example is the California law legalizing medicinal uses of marijuana in direct conflict
with federal law criminalizing such uses. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). That law
was supported by advocates of marijuana legalization as a means of both deligitimizing the federal
policy of criminalization and challenging the federal government's authority to criminalize
medicinal uses of marijuana under the Commerce Clause.
42. One scholar has argued that congressional authority to effect these two types of
preemption might potentially rest on two different constitutional provisions. See generally Stephen
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 795 (1996) (discussing
differences between the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause as sources of
Congress's authority to preempt state laws).
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refinement of the traditional test for finding "field" preemption. That
traditional test asks whether federal regulation so pervades a substantive area
of law that it allows no room for state supplementation.43 But if one were
considering not state lawmaking but federal agency lawmaking and the
question were the same - whether a given federal statute had so pervasively
occupied the field as to leave no room for supplementation via
administrative regulations - the answer would be obvious. 44 There is
always potential clarification, supplementation, and administrative
interpretation that an agency might conceivably engage in to flesh out a
given statutory regime. Accordingly, the "pervasiveness" test for field
preemption is difficult to apply with consistency. One can always imagine
further, additional levels of regulation - whether by federal administrators
or state legislatures. The question becomes how pervasive is pervasive
enough to preempt?
C. Rule 3: The PresumptionAgainst Preemption
A complete answer to that critical question must include consideration
of the third black letter rule of current doctrine - the presumption against
preemption in areas of traditional state authority. An obvious difficulty with
this presumption is that its application can depend on how the inquiry is
framed. In the medical device context, one might ask whether it is within
traditional notions of state authority for States to govern the design and
manufacture of federally licensed, completely standardized goods shipped
everywhere in the United States in interstate commerce. Framed in this
manner, the answer is "no." Alternatively, however, one might ask whether
States have traditionally legislated to ensure the health and safety of their
citizens. Stated in this manner, the answer is "yes." More generally, the
traditional-authority inquiry will almost always be sufficiently elastic to ask
either whether States have traditionally regulated the cross-border and
economic aspects of an activity (like selling medical devices or
pharmaceuticals) or, alternatively, whether they have regulated the localized,
health-and-safety aspects of that same activity. A principled choice between
these alternatives is difficult to achieve under current doctrine.
Here again, the underlying logic of preemption may show the way.
Findings of federal preemption are often rooted in the need to protect federal
resolutions of problems requiring the balancing of competing objectives cases where Congress or a federal agency has arrived at what is assertedly an
optimal level of regulation.4 5 Such analysis can be seen in the early
ratemaking preemption cases.46 If the Interstate Commerce Commission

43.
44.
45.
46.

See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
Cf Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See, e.g., Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Kan. Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 513-14 (1989).
See S. Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912).

sets a transportation rate that fairly balances the interests of shippers and
customers, that rate should be regarded as an optimum and protected against
State attempts to make shifts in either direction. Customers get their fair
price; shippers get their fair return on investment; and by definition any
movement from that set rate undermines one federal objective or the other,
thus conflicting with the federal regime.47 Another example of this logic
comes from the Supreme Court's recognition of what amounts to implied
preemption under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 48 Although
the NLRA contains no express preemption provision, some of the most
potent instances of preemption appear in the NLRA context. 49 The
explanation for this preemptive potency likely lies in the fact that the NLRA,
like ratemaking statutes, seeks to strike a balance, optimum, or golden mean.
Courts have emphasized that in enacting the NLRA, Congress specified the
various powers of unions and management in order to achieve a balance of
power in the collective-bargaining process.5 ° Accordingly, States that try to
upset this equilibrium balance - whether to the advantage of unions or
management - necessarily encroach upon a field of economic activity
impliedly reserved for federally ordered private conduct.
In the pharmaceutical and medical device context, the case for implied
field preemption rests on the premise that drug and device approval
processes undertaken by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") were
established to strike just the right balance between protecting consumers
from harmful products and preserving manufacturers' ability to sell
therapeutic products - including those with known health-and safety risks
and side effects. 5' Given that premise, the preemption presumption in the
drug and device context should be not one against federal preemption, but
one in favor of preempting state regulation that upsets this delicate federal
balance. That is, courts should apply a strong presumption in favor of
preempting state common law, statutory, or regulatory standards that conflict
with policy balances implicit in FDA drug or device approvals.

47. See id. at 436, 442 (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act had "taken possession of the
field" of interstate railroad rate regulation and that consequently both existing state laws and future
exercises of state lawmaking in the field had been "superseded").
48. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
288-89 (1986).
49. Livados v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (holding California Labor Commissioner's
policy preempted by federal law); Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (holding that
Florida's refusal to pay unemployment insurance frustrated Congressional purpose and, therefore, is
preempted).
50. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-211 (1985); Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962); see also Chamber of Commerce of the
United States. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (1996) (holding that National Labor Relations Act provision
guaranteeing management's right to hire permanent replacements during labor strikes preempted
conflicting Executive Order made under the Procurement Act).
51. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
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III. CONCLUSION
As I have attempted to show, the Supreme Court's preemption
jurisprudence rests on three mostly uncontroversial rules that cannot be
readily and directly applied in a manner that adequately protects federal
policy from intrusions by the fifty States. Instead of continuing to apply
them, our constitutional system would be better served if the Court were to
carefully reformulate these rules in conformity with the structural logic of
federal preemption. This reformulation should include at a minimum (i) the
recognition by courts that they, not the Congress, must serve as primary
guardians of federal law against state intrusions; (ii) better understandings of
the underlying logic and overlapping nature of the doctrinal categories of
preemption analysis; and (iii) a recognition that when federal policies are
carefully calibrated to achieve a delicate balance of competing objectives,
presumptions should weigh in favor of, not against, federal preemption of
state law.
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